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The Battle of Removal-Is Delay the Ultimate Weapon?: A
Note on Martine v. National Tea Company
[Tihe Federal courts may, and should, take such action as will defeat
attempts to wrongfully deprive parties entitled to sue in Federal courts of
the protection of their rights in those tribunals.'
I. INTRODUCTION
Almost a century ago, the Supreme Court of the United States recognized the
importance of protecting a party's right to remove a suit to federal court. Indeed,
this right would be illusory if a party could defeat removal through simple
manipulation or inaction. Under authorization of the United States Constitution,2
Congress conferred upon federal district courts original jurisdiction over controver-
sies involving citizens of different states.3 Congress also conferred upon the
defendant the right to remove an action from state to federal court if the district
court has original jurisdiction based on diversity of citizenship.4 Congress' intent
in creating diversity jurisdiction and the right of removal was to protect out-of-state
parties from local prejudice.5
1. Wecker v. National Enameling and Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 182-83, 27 S. Ct. 184, 187
(1907) (quoting Alabama Great S. Ry. Co. v. Thompson, 200 U.S. 206,218,26 S. Ct. 161, 165 (1906))
(cited with approval by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Grassi v. Ciba-Geigy, Ltd.,
894 F.2d 181, 183 (1990)).
2. U.S. Const. art. 1, § 8.
3. 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1988) provides in pertinent part:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in
controversy exceeds the sum or value of $50,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is be-
tween-
(1) citizens of different States;
(2) citizens of a State and citizens or subjects of a foreign state;
(3) citizens of different States and in which citizens or subjects of a foreign state are
additional parties; and
(4) a foreign state, defined in section 1603(a) of this title, as plaintiff and citizens of a State
or of different States.
4. 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) provides in pertinent part:
(a) Except as otherwise expressly provided by Act of Congress, any civil action brought in
a State court of which the district courts of the United States have original jurisdiction, may
be removed by the defendant or the defendants, to the district court of the United States for
the district and division embracing the place where such action is pending. For purposes of
removal under this chapter, the citizenship of defendants sued under fictitious names shall
be disregarded.
(b) Any civil action of which the district courts have original jurisdiction founded on a claim
or right arising under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United States shall be
removable without regard to the citizenship or residence of the parties. Any other such
action shall be removable only if none of the parties in interest properly joined and served
as defendants is a citizen of the State in which such action is brought.
5. See Barrow S.S. Co. v. Kane, 170 U.S. 100, 111, 18 S. Ct. 526, 530 (1898) (holding that
the purpose was to "secure a tribunal presumed to be more impartial than a court of the state in which
one of the litigants resides").
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Although Congress' intent is clear, plaintiffs often deprive defendants of their
right to remove suits to federal court. Do federal courts have the power to protect
the right of a party to remove a suit or are they powerless to curb abusive practices
by plaintiffs that prevent removal? The recent case of Martine v. National Tea
Co. 6 illustrates how a court allowed, though reluctantly, a plaintiff to circumvent
removal under 28 U.S.C. § 1446 by intentionally withholding service on the
defendant for over a year.7 This note recommends that federal courts and Congress
not tolerate or condone plaintiffs' abusive practices that deprive defendants of their
right of removal.
This case note will analyze the federal court's interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §
1446 in Martine, focusing primarily on the one-year time limit provided in §
1446(b). This note will also discuss (1) whether the time limits under 28 U.S.C. §
1446 are procedural or jurisdictional; (2) the interrelation of Louisiana Code of
Civil Procedure article 421 and 28 U.S.C. § 1446; (3) whether the court has the
power to curb abusive tactics designed to defeat removal; and (4) proposed
solutions to curb abusive practices that prevent a party from removing a suit to
federal court.
II. FACTS OF MARTINE
On August 26, 1991, Alexis and Paula Martine filed suit in the 19th Judicial
District Court in East Baton Rouge Parish, Louisiana. The plaintiffs named as
defendants the National Tea Company (doing business as the Real Super Store),
Kelley Company, Inc. (Kelley), and Gambit International, Inc., along with their
respective liability insurers. The plaintiffs withheld service until one year had
6. 841 F. Supp. 1421 (M.D. La.), reconsideration denied, 837 F. Supp. 749 (1993), interlocutory
appeal denied, No. 93-0193 (5th Cir., February 25, 1994).
7. 28 U.S.C. § 1446 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) provides in pertinent part:
(a) A defendant or defendants desiring to remove any civil action or criminal prosecution
from a State court shall file in the district court of the United States for the district and
division within which such action is pending a notice of removal signed pursuant to Rule 11
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and containing a short and plain statement of the
grounds for removal, together with a copy of all process, pleadings, and orders served upon
such defendant or defendants in such action.
(b) The notice of removal of a civil action or proceeding shall be filed within thirty days
after the receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of the initial
pleading setting forth the claim for relief upon which such action or proceeding is based, or
within thirty days after the service of summons upon the defendant if such initial pleading
has then been filed in court and is not required to be served on the defendant, whichever
period is shorter.
If the case stated by the initial pleading is not removable, a notice of removal may be filed
within thirty days after receipt by the defendant, through service or otherwise, of a copy of
an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper from which it may first be ascertained
that the case is one which is or has become removable, except that a case may not be
removed on the basis of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than 1 year
after commencement of the action.
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lapsed from the date the state court suit was filed. Thereafter, they served Kelley
on September 11, 1992.8 Kelley timely filed a notice of removal 9 on October 9,
1992,0 claiming diversity of citizenship as a basis for subject matter jurisdiction
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1332. On October 14, 1992, Kelley filed a supplemental
notice of removal. The plaintiffs responded by filing a timely motion to remand."
The issue before the federal court was whether the defendant was barred from
removing the case to federal court by the one-year time limit for removal in
diversity actions under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). 2
The plaintiffs argued that remand was appropriate because the defendant had
filed the notice of removal "more than one year after commencement of the action"
in violation of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). They argued that according to Louisiana Code
of Civil Procedure article 421,3 an action commences when it is filed, regardless
of whether any attempt to perfect service is made. Hence, the plaintiffs contended
that the action commenced on August 29, 1991, the date the suit was filed. Because
the defendant filed a notice of removal on October 9, 1992, more than one year
later, the plaintiffs maintained, under a plain reading of § 1446(b), that the removal
was improper and the case must be remanded to state court.
The defendants argued that removal of the case did not violate the one-year
time bar of § 1446(b). They contended that an action commences by the filing of
the petition accompanied by a bona fide effort to serve the defendant. Hence, the
action did not commence until September 11, 1992, when the plaintiffs actually
served the defendant with a copy of the state court petition. Therefore, the notice
of removal filed on October 9, 1992, was within the one-year time bar.
The United States district court granted the plaintiffs' motion to remand the
action. The court held that under Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 421 an
action is commenced by the filing of a pleading, irrespective of whether the
plaintiff served the defendant with process. "By delaying service on [the
defendant] for over a year, plaintiffs ensured that this action could not be timely
8. Service of process was made pursuant to La. R.S. 13:3201 (1991).
9. The 1988 amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) replaced the phrase "petition for removal" with
"notice of removal" to coordinate with the change made in § 1446(a) that subjects the new "notice of
removal" to Rule 11 sanctions. Congress deemed these only minor changes. See H.R. Rep. No. 889,
100th Cong.. 2d Sess. 71 (1988).
10. Kelley filed within 30 days after receiving, through service, the copy of the initial pleading,
as required under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b). The time limits for removal are discussed infra in the text
accompanying notes 44-50.
11. Martine v. National Tea Co.,.841 F. Supp. 1421, 1421-22 (M.D. La.), reconsideration denied,
837 F. Supp. 749 (1993), interlocutory appeal denied, No. 93-0193 (5th Cir., February 25, 1994).
12. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) "acase may not be removed on the basis
of jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than I year after commencement of the
action." See supra note 7.
13. La. Code Civ. P. art. 421 provides: "A civil action is a demand for the enforcement of a legal
right. It is commenced by the filing of a pleading presenting the demand to a court of competent
jurisdiction. Amicable demand is not a condition precedent.to a civil action, unless specifically required
by law."
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removed by [the defendant] to a federal forum"'' 4 because according to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b), "the case cannot be removed to federal court more than one year after
the commencement of the action in state court."' 5
The Martine court recognized the abuses and inequities that could result from
the one-year limitation.1 6  It also acknowledged that the courts have created
exceptions to prevent similar abusive practices.'7 Nevertheless, the court refused
to create an exception to prevent the abusive practice. The Martine court concluded
that Congress should rewrite the provisions of § 1446(b) to curb such abuses and
inequities.1
8
The Martine court also recognized that a contrary decision had been reached
by a federal district court in Alabama because the Alabama Code of Civil
Procedure has been interpreted to mandate a 'good faith effort to serve the
defendant. '"
The defendant's right to remove and the plaintiff's right to choose the trial
forum often collide, requiring the court and Congress to resolve the conflict. This
note will focus on these conflicting rights and the intricacies of 28 U.S.C. § 1446.
However, a general discussion of removal jurisdiction and the procedure for
removal is beneficial for a full understanding of the issues involved.
14. Martine, 841 F. Supp. at 1422.
15. Id.
16. As discussed infra at notes 64-74 and accompanying text, the one-year time limit was placed
in § 1446(b) to stop removal of cases where substantial action had been taken in state court prior to
removal. In Martine, while ruling on the defendant's motion to reconsider, the court correctly
recognized that the removal did not interfere with any state court proceeding because of the plaintiffs'
decision to withhold service. Martine v. National Tea Co., 837 F. Supp. 749, 750 (M.D. La. 1993),
interlocutory appeal denied, No. 93-0193 (5th Cir., February 25, 1994).
17. The Martine court stated:
Decisions have been rendered by the United States Supreme Court and various appellate
courts, including the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals, involving instances where a plaintiff has
intentionally sought to prevent a defendant from removing a case to federal court. For
example, where a plaintiff intentionally adds as a defendant a resident of the plaintiff's state
to prevent the defendant from removing the case to federal court because of the lack of
complete diversity [of] citizenship between the parties, the courts have applied the rule of
fraudulent joinder which allows the court to disregard the resident defendants.
Id. (footnotes omitted).
18. The court explained:
This court recognizes that the one year limitation upon removal lends itself to abuses and
inequities, particularly where, as here, the [plaintiffs] did not attempt service on the
defendant until more than one year after the suit was tiled in state court. However, it is for
the Congress and not this Court to rewrite the provisions of section 1446(b) to curb such
abuses.
Martine, 841 F. Supp. at 1422.
19, "The Court recognizes [Greer v. Stilcraft, 704 F. Supp. 1570 (N.D. Ala. 1989)] rendered by
Judge Sam C. Pointer, Jr., Chairman of the Judicial Conference Advisory Committee on Civil Rules
reaches a contrary result from this Court's ruling..This difference may be due in part to the difference
in the laws of the states of Louisiana and Alabama." Martine, 837 F. Supp. at 750.
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III. REMOVAL JURISDICTION
The United States Congress has conferred upon defendants the right to remove
a case from state to federal court.' The Constitution does not grant the right of
removal; the right is purely statutory.2 Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has
recognized the importance of the defendant's right of removal, stating that "[tihe
Federal courts should not sanction devices intended to prevent a removal to a
Federal court where one has that right., 22 In general, 28 U.S.C. § 1441 authorizes
defendants to remove cases over which the district courts have the requisite subject
matter jurisdiction.
Parties attempting removal primarily rely on 28 U.S.C. § 1331,23 federal
question jurisdiction, and 28 U.S.C. § 1332,' diversity jurisdiction, as bases for
removal under § 1441.5 Accordingly, "the principles governing federal question
jurisdiction, [and] diversity of citizenship jurisdiction ... are applicable to
removal."' 6 For example, for purposes of original federal question subject matter
jurisdiction, a case arises "under the Constitution, treaties or laws of the United
States" if the adjudication depends on the application of any of these sources of
federal law. This general principle of federal question jurisdiction also applies to
removal jurisdiction under § 1441(b)." Similarly, the basic principles of diversity
jurisdiction, such as the requirement of complete diversity between plaintiffs and
defendants and the amount in controversy requirement, are fully applicable to §
1441(b). 8
Although federal question and diversity cases are the actions most commonly
removed, there exist several other grounds for removal. These include actions
involving separate and independent claims or causes of action; 29 actions against
a foreign state;' actions against federal officers, members of the armed forces, or
20. See supra note 4.
21. 14A Charles Alan Wright et al., Federal Practice and Procedure § 372 ],at 185-86 (1985) ("The
ight to remove a case from a state to a federal court is purely statutory and therefore is entirely
dependent on the will of Congress") (footnotes omitted).
22. Weckerv. National Enameling and Stamping Co., 204 U.S. 176, 186,27 S. Ct. 184, 188 (1907)
(cited with approval by the United States Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Grassi v. Ceba-Geigy, Ltd.,
894 F.2d 181,183 (1990)). See also Heniford v. American Motors Sales Corp., 471 F. Supp. 328, 335
(D.S.C. 1979) ("Although the right of removal is a statutory right, it is a substantial right of the nonresi-
dent defendant.").
23. 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1988 & Supp. IV 1992) provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions arising under the
Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States.
24. See supra note 3.
25. See supra note 4.
26. Wright et al., supra note 21, at 192 (footnotes omitted).
27. Id. § 3722, at 231-32.
28. For a more detailed discussion of removal based on federal question and diversity of citizen-
ship, see Wright et al., supra note 21, § 3722 and § 3723. respectively.
29. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1992).
30. 28 U.S.C. § 1441(d) (1988).
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federal employees;3 or actions involving civil rights that are guaranteed by the
Constitution of the United States.a2
IV. PROCEDURE FOR REMOVAL
Determining that a federal district court has jurisdiction over the action fulfills
only part of the requirement for removal under § 1441(a). This section also
requires that the action "be removed by the defendant or the defendants." Thus,
only a defendant possesses the right to remove.33 "A plaintiff may not remove a
case to federal court, even when they are in a position of a defendant with regard
to counterclaims asserted against him."'
Federal law determines who is a plaintiff and who is a defendant for purposes
of applying the removal statute." The federal court may realign the parties
according to their real interest before it decides whether the case was properly
removed by a defendant. 36 Additionally, "[clourts have consistently construed 28
U.S.C. § 1446(a) to require that all defendants either join the petition for removal
or to consent to such removal. 3 7 However, this rule does not apply when: (1) the
non-joining defendant has not been served with process at the time the removalpetition is filed; 38 (2) the non-joining defendant is merely a nominal or formal
party;39 (3) the removal claim is a separate and independent claim as defined by
31. 28 U.S.C. § 1442 (1988), 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a) (1988), and 28 U.S.C. § 2679(d) (1988),
respectively.
32. 28 U.S.C. § 1443 (1988).
33. Chicago, R. I. and P. R.R. Co. v. Stude, 346 U.S. 574, 580, 74 S. Ct. 290, 294 (1954) ("[Tjhe
plaintiff under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a) ... cannot remove."); Carlton v. Withers, 609 F. Supp. 146, 149
(M.D. La. 1985) ("Section 1446(a) authorizes removal only by defendants.") (footnotes omitted).
34. Carlton. 609 F. Supp. at 149. See also Oregon Egg Producers v. Andrew. 458 F.2d 382, 383
(9th Cir. 1972) ("A plaintiff who commences his action in a state court cannot effectuate removal to a
federal court even if he could have originated the action in a federal court and even if a counterclaim is
thereafter filed that states a claim cognizable in a federal court.") (citation omitied).
35. "For the purpose of removal, the federal law determines who is plaintiff and who is defendant,
It is a question of the construction of the federal statute on removal, and not the state statute." Chicago,
R. L and P. R.R. Co., 346 U.S. at 580. 74 S. Ct. at 294. See also Shamrock Oil and Gas Corp. v. Sheets,
313 U.S. 100, 104,61 S. Ct. 868, 870 (1941) ("The removal statute, which is nationwide in its operation,
was intended to be uniform in its application, unaffected by local law definition or characterization of
the subject matter to which it is to be applied.").
36. See Carlton, 609 F. Supp. at 149-50 (the district court denied an intervenor the right to remove
a counterclaim filed against him, holding that the intervenor would be aligned as a plaintiff for purposes
of removal).
37. Courtney v. Benedetto, 627 F. Supp. 523, 525 (M.D. La. 1986) (footnote omitted). See also
Johnson v. Helmerich & Payne, Inc., 892 F.2d 422,423 (5th Cir. 1990) (citing Tri-Cities Newspapers,
Inc. v. Tri-Cities P.P. & A. Local 349,427 F.2d 325 (5th Cir. 1970), and Harris v. Edward Hyman Co.,
664 F.2d 943, 944 n.3 (5th Cir. 1981) (per curiam)). The court in Tri.Cities Newspapers. Inc. said:
"The law is clear that under 28 U.S.C. § 1446(a), removal procedure requires that all defendants join in
the removal petition." Tri-Cities Newspapers, hic., 427 F.2d at 326-27.
38. See, e.g., Pullman Co. v. Jenkins, 305 U.S. 534, 59 S. Ct. 347 (1939).
39. See, e.g., Norman v. Cuomo, 796 F. Supp. 654 (N.D.N.Y. 1992) (per curiam) (non-consenting
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28 U.S.C. § 1441(c); ° or (4) the court determines that the non-joining defendant
was improperly joined.4 If a defendant does not join or consent to the notice of
removal, the notice must set forth the reason why the defendant has not joined in
the removal,"' or the notice will be considered defective.43
A. Time for Removal
The time within which a defendant must file a notice of removal is set forth in
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b).' The first paragraph of § 1446(b) covers those cases that
are initially removable from state court. The defendant has thirty days to file a
notice of removal after receiving a copy of the initial pleading, through service or
otherwise.4 In states that do not require the plaintiff to furnish the defendant with
defendants were nominal parties whose consent to removal was not required); Tri-Cities Newspapers,
Inc., 427 F.2d at 327 ("[N]ominal or formal parties ... are not required to join in the petition for
removal.").
40. See, e.g., Lemke v. St. Margaret Hosp., 552 F. Supp. 833 (N.D. Ill. 1982).
41. See, e.g., Courtney v. Benedetto, 627 F. Supp. 523 (M.D. La. 1986); Derry v. Roadway
Express. Inc., 248 F. Supp. 843 (E.D. Ky. 1965).
42. See, e.g., Lewis v. Rego Co., 757 F.2d 66 (3d Cir. 1985).
43. See id.; Romashko v. Avco Corp., 553 F. Supp. 391, 392 (N.D. Ill. 1983) ("It is defendant's
burden under the removal statute.., to explain affirmatively the absence of codefendants in the petition
for removal, and failure to set out such an explanation renders the removal petition defective.").
44. See supra note 7.
45. The courts are split as to the meaning of the phrase "service or otherwise." The issue revolves
around whether the 30-day removal period commences when the defendant receives a copy of the initial
pleading or when proper service is effected upon the defendant.
According to one view, the removal period"cannot commence until a plaintiff properly serves
[the) defendant with process." Love v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 542 F. Supp. 65, 68 (N.D. Ga.
1982). In other words, actual receipt by the defendant of an initial complaint does not trigger the
removal period unless the defendant is properly servEd. The Love case has become representative of this
view. For cases following Love, see Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Fugi Photo Film Co., 645 F. Supp.
37 (S.D. Fla. 1986) (30-day period for removal commences on date defendant has been served pursuant
to state law and has also received a copy of the complaint); Hunter v. American Express Travel Related
Servs., 643 F. Supp. 168 (S.D. Miss. 1986) (service attempted but defective); Thomason v. Republic Ins.
Co., 630 F. Supp. 331 (E.D. Cal. 1986) (defective service); Skinner v. Old S. Life Ins. Co., 572 F. Supp.
811 (W.D. La. 1983); Quick Erectors, Inc. v. Seattle Bronze Corp., 524 F. Supp. 351 (E.D. Mo. 1981)
(receipt of complaint other than through process).
According to another approach, it is not necessary for a plaintiff to properly serve the defendant
in accordance with state law to trigger the 30-day period. Instead, the 30-day period begins to run from
the date the defendant received the initial pleading setting forth a removable claim. This rule has
generally been characterized the "receipt rule." Tyler v. Prudential Ins. Co. of America, 524 F. Supp.
1211 (W.D. Pa. 1981), represents this view. For cases that have adopted the Tyler interpretation, see
Trepel v. Kohn, Milstein, Cohen & Hausfeld, 789 F. Supp. 881 (E.D. Mich. 1992) (receipt of summons
and complaint by registered mail); Wortham v. Executone Info. Sys., Inc., 788 F. Supp. 324 (S.D. Tex.
1992) (receipt of petition though not formally served with process); Arnold v. Federal Land Bank, 747
F. Supp. 342 (M.D. La. 1990) (defective service was sufficient to trigger 30-day time limit); Dawson
v. Orkin Exterminating Co., 736 F. Supp. 1049 (D. Colo. 1990) (receipt of complaint date-stamped by
the state court by certified mail); Uhles v. F.W. Woolworth Co., 715 F. Supp. 297 (C.D. Cal. 1989)
(courtesy copy of complaint given during settlement negotiations before properly served under state
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a copy of the initial pleading, the defendant must file the notice of removal within
thirty days after the defendant receives service of summons.4
The second paragraph of § 1446(b) provides for cases that were not initially
removable when filed in state court, but subsequently became removable.47 In
those cases, the non-resident defendant must file the notice of removal after
receiving a copy of "an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper" from
which the defendant can first ascertain that the case is removable.48
Congress amended the second paragraph of § 1446(b) in 1988 to prevent the
defendant from removing a case based on diversity jurisdiction more than one year
after commencement of the action.4 ' This one-year limitation does not apply to
cases in which subject matter jurisdiction is based on federal question jurisdiction
as Congress explicitly limited its application to cases "removed on the basis of
jurisdiction conferred by section 1332. "5
B. One- Year Time Limit: Procedural or Jurisdictional?
Two important issues regarding the one-year limitation on removal of diversity
suits exist: (1) whether the one-year time limit is procedural or jurisdictional; and
(2) when is an action commenced in state court, thereby starting the running of the
one-year limitation. To resolve these issues, it is necessary to review the jurispru-
dence, the removal statutes involved, and the legislative history of these removal
statutes.
The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in Barnes v. Westinghouse Electric
Corp.5' held that the one-year limitation of § 1446(b) is procedural, not jurisdic-
law); Pic-Mount Corp. v. Stoffel Seals Corp., 708 F. Supp. 1113 (D. Nev. 1989) (receipt of file stamped
copy of complaint before formal service).
46. Only if the initial pleading has then been filed in state court does the 30-day period begin to
run. This is to ensure that when the defendant recdtves the service of summons, the initial pleading is
on file in the state court clerk's office. Arnold, 747 F. Supp. at 344.
47. For example, a case may not initially be removable because of lack of diversity, as when the
plaintiff sues a resident defendant, However, if the plaintiff thereafter settles with the resident defendant
and all the other defendants are non-residents, the case becomes removable. Nevertheless, plaintiff must
voluntarily dismiss the resident defendant. Involuntary dismissal of the resident defendant does not
render the action removable. Higgins v. E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co., 863 F.2d 1162 (4th Cir. 1988);
Power v. Norfolk & W. Ry. Co., 778 F. Stipp. 468 (E.D. Mo. 1991) (involuntary dismissal of a non-
diverse defendant did not permit removal of the state court case to federal court); Canova v. C.R.C., Inc.,
602 F. Supp. 817 (M.D. La. 1985) (a case, originally not removable, did not thereafter become
removable due to dismissal of non-diverse party, where dismissal was not by voluntary act of the
plaintiff).
48. Although the statute requires receipt of an amended pleading, motion, order or other paper, "its
clear purpose is to commence the running of the thirty-day period once the defendant receives actual
notice that the case has become removable, which may be communicated in a formal or informal
manner." Wright et al., supra note 21, § 3732, at 520.
49. Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016, 102 Stat. 4669 ("[A] case may not be removed on the basis of
jurisdiction conferred by section 1332 of this title more than I year after commencement of the action.").
50. Id.
51. 962 F.2d 513, 516 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 600 (1992).
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tional, and may be waived. Further, in Hopkins v. Dolphin Titan International,
Inc.,52 the Fifth Circuit affirmed its previous holding that the word "procedural"
in § 1447(c)5 3 refers to any defect that does not involve the subject matter
jurisdiction of the federal district court. Therefore, if the defendant's notice of
removal is filed after the one-year limit has lapsed, the notice is only procedurally
defective.
Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c), "a motion to remand the case on the basis of any
defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after the filing of the
notice of removal under section 1446(a). '"M Therefore, a plaintiff who fails to file
a timely motion to remand based on a violation of the one-year time limitation
waives his right to have the case remanded to state court. The thirty-day limitation
to file a motion to remand does not apply to motions to remand based on the lack
of subject matter jurisdiction. Such a motion may be filed any time, and if "at any
time before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded" to state court.55 The court may also
remand a suit to state court on its own motion if the federal court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction.56
The procedural nature of the one-year time limit does not actually curb
plaintiffs' practices designed to prevent removal. However, it allows a defendant
to counteract the plaintiff's attempt to prevent removal if the plaintiff fails to file
a timely motion to remand.
V. ANALYSIS OF 28 U.S.C. § 1446
A. Statutory Language
Congress amended the second paragraph of § 1446(b) to include a one-year
time limit for removal of cases based on diversity jurisdiction. Although Congress
failed to state explicitly the effective date of the amendments, the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals has held that the effective date of the amendments to § 1446(b)
and § 1447(c) is November 19, 1988, the date of enactment.57 Several courts have
52. 976 F.2d 924, 926 (5th Cir. 1992).
53. 28 U.S.C. 1447(c) (1988) states in part:
A motion to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made
within 30 days after the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time
before final judgment it appears that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the
case shall be remanded.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. See, e.g., Nixon v. O'Callaghan, 392 F. Supp. 1081, 1084-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1975). See also
Wright et al., supra note 21, § 3739 n.4.
57. Barnes v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 962 F.2d 513, 515 n.7 (5th Cir. 1992) ("[T]he effective
date of ... sections [1446(b) and 1447(c)] is the date the Act was enacted, which is November 19,
1988."). See also In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1523, 1526 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 914
(1992); Royer v. Harris Well Serv., Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1247, 1248 (M.D. La, 1990); Horn v. Service
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also applied the amendments retroactively to cases pending in state court on the
statute's effective date.58
The parties in Martine disagreed as to whether federal law or state law
determines when a case commences for purposes of § 1446. In their brief to the
court, the defendants argued that "[tihe removal statute which is nationwide in its
operation, [is] intended to be uniform in its application, unaffected by local law
definition or characterization of the subject matter to which it is to be applied."59
Therefore, according to the defendants in Martine, federal law should define
commencement for purposes of § 1446. The Martine court ruled, however, that
state law determines the commencement of the action for purposes of the one-year
limit on removal. 60 The congressional statute does not have a nationwide
definition for commencement, therefore, state law is essentially the only alterna-
61tive.
The differences in state law have led to conflicting decisions in the federal
courts regarding the interpretation and application of the one-year limit of §
Merchandise Co., 727 F. Supp. 1343, 1344 (N.D. Cal. 1990); Greer v. Skilcraft, 704 F. Supp. 1570, 1573
(N.D. Ala. 1989).
58. Barnes, 962 F.2d at 515 n.7; hire Shell Oil Co.,932 F.2d at 1526; Royer, 741 F. Supp. at 1248;
Hon, 727 F. Supp. at 1344; Greer, 704 F. Supp. at 1580.
59. Opposition to Motion to Remand, Martine v. National Tea Co., 841 F. Supp. 1421 (M.D. La.),
reconsideration denied, 837 F. Supp. 749 (1993), interlocutory appeal denied, No. 93-0193 (5th Cir.,
February 25, 1994). Defendant cites Shamrock Oil and Gas Corp. v. Sheets, 313 U.S. 100, 105, 61 S.
Ct. 868, 870 (1941). See also Grubbs v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 405 U.S. 699, 705, 92 S. Ct. 1344,
1349 (1972), in which the Supreme Court reaffirmed its position; Brown v. Demco, Inc., 792 F.2d 478,
480 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing Grubbs and Shamrock); and Paxton v. Weaver, 553 F.2d 936, 940 (5th Cir.
1977) (citing Grubbs).
60. Martine, 841 F. Supp. at 1421. For other cases holding that state law determines commence-
ment under § 1446(b), see Saunders v. Wire Rope Corp., 777 F. Supp. 1281, 1283 (E.D. Va. 1991) ("The
determination of the 'commencement of the action' for the purpose of the one year limit on removal is
governed by Virginia law."); Robinson v. J.F. Cleckley & Co.. 751 F. Supp. 100. 104 (D.S.C. 1990) ("It
is abundantly clear that the terms of 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) are to be defined by reference to state law.");
Coman v. International Playtex, Inc., 713 F. Supp. 1324, 1328 (N.D. Cal. 1989); Greer v. Skilcraft, 704
F. Supp. 1570, 1582-83 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
61. Several courts have used this rationale in determining whether prescription has run in a case
brought under a federal statute. Thus, federal courts will apply state law to determine whether a suit
filed under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 was timely filed. To bring some uniformity to the prescription issue,
Congress has recently enacted 28 U.S.C. § 1658 (1990). which sets forth a four-year statute of
limitations for all cases filed pursuant to federal statutes enacted on or after December 1, 1990. For
cases filed pursuant to acts passed before December 1, 1990, the various state law prescriptive periods
continue to apply. Because Congress defined when a suit is prescribed, it can also define when a suit
is "commenced" for the purposes of removal. But Congress has not defined "commenced" in the
removal statute; therefore, courts must look to state law to determine when a suit is commenced for
purposes of removal.
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1446.62 Congress could remedy these conflicting results by creating a uniform
definition of "commencement" for § 1446.63
B. Legislative History
One of Congress' objectives in amending § 1446(b) to include a one-year
limitation on removal was to address problems that arise from a change of parties
as an action progresses toward trial in state court.M Congress wanted to reduce
the opportunity for removal after substantial progress has been made in state court
to avoid delay and disruption in the state court.65 In effect the amendment would
also help preserve comity between the state and federal courts.6
Although Congress' intent was to reduce removal where substantial progress
has been made in state court, the statutory language does not define the amount of
progress that must occur in the state court action before removal becomes
impermissible. The statute merely prohibits removal more than one year after
commencement of the action in state court. This rule allows for uniform
application and relieves the court of the problem of determining whether substantial
progress has been made in state court. However, the statute as currently phrased
also prevents removal of cases that have not progressed at all in the state court. The
Martine case had not progressed in the least because the plaintiff had withheld
service; nevertheless, the court held that § 1446(b) required remand. The Martine
court was obviously concerned with this problem: "It is very difficult to see how
a removal under the facts of this case can interfere with the state court proceedings
62. The application of § 1446 in Martine conflicts with the result in Greer v. Skilcraft, 704 F.
Supp. 1570 (N.D. Ala. 1989), because Louisiana's definition of "commencement" differs from
Alabama's. See infra text accompanying notes 92-94.
63. See infra text accompanying notes 127-128.
64. The legislative history reveals in pertinent part:
All of the proposed amendments in this section relate to removal jurisdiction. The
amendments would, among other things.., establish a one-year limit on removal based on
diversity jurisdiction....
Subsection (b)(2) amends 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) to establish a one-year limit on removal based
on diversity jurisdiction as a means of reducing the opportunity for removal after substantial
progress has been made in state court. The result is a modest curtailment in access to
diversity jurisdiction. The amendment addresses problems that arise from a change of
parties as an action progresses toward trial in state court. The elimination of parties may
create for the first time a party alignment that supports diversity jurisdiction. Under section
1446(b), removal is possible whenever this event occurs, so long as the change of parties was
voluntary as to the plaintiff. Settlement with a diversity-destroying defendant on the eve of
trial, for example, may permit the remaining defendants to remove. Removal late in the
proceedings may result in substantial delay and disruption.
H.R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Cong., 2d Sess. 71-73 (1988) (reprinted in 1988 U.S. Cong. & Admin. News
5982, 6031-33).
65. id.
66. Courts have strictly construed removal statutes to preserve comity between the state and federal
courts. See, e.g., Phillips v, Allstate Ins. Co., 702 F. Supp. 1466, 1468 (C.D. Cal. 1989). Strict
construction of removal statutes is discussed infra in text accompanying notes 113-115.
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when none have occurred because of plaintiffs' decision to withhold service until
the one year time limitation has expired." 67
The legislative history reflects Congress' concern with "[riemoval late in the
proceedings ... result[ing] in substantial delay and disruption."" In many cases
in which the amendment bans removal, however, the removal would not cause any
delay or disruption to the pending case. On the other hand, the amendment
encourages wily plaintiffs to delay the judicial process. The case of Martine
illustrates this point. The plaintiffs in Martine intentionally withheld service from
the defendant for more than one year after the commencement of the state court
action to prevent the defendant from removing the case to federal court. This
inaction delayed the judicial process in both state and federal court. By permitting
the plaintiffs to engage in such practice, the Martine court may encourage other
plaintiffs to delay the judicial process in the same manner. Although some courts
acknowledge Congress' intent to prevent removal when there has been substantial
progress in state court, they contend that § 1446 gives them no choice but to
remand the case, even if it has not progressed at all in state court.69 On the other
hand, other courts refuse to accept that Congress intended to provide "the plaintiff
the power to prevent removal by manipulation and inaction. 70  These courts
refused to remand the case to state court because they believed the language of §
1446 lead to absurd results. These courts invoked the congressional intent of the
amendment tojustify their holding-"[t]he one-year ban [is] intended to reduce, not
encourage, delays in case adjudication."'" Further, these courts note that the
power given to the plaintiff not only results in delay of case adjudication, but also
gives the plaintiff the power to eliminate diversity jurisdiction altogether.72
The court in Martine questioned whether removing an action that had not
progressed in state court was consistent with the congressional intent of §
1446(b). 73  Nevertheless, the court applied the letter of the law, rejecting the
67. Martine v. National Tea Co., 837 F. Supp. 749, 750 (M.D. La. 1993), interlocutory appeal
denied, No. 93-0193 (5th Cir., February 25, 1994).
68. H.R. Rep. No. 889, 100th Congress, 2d Sess. 71-73 (1988).
69. Martine, 837 F. Supp. at 750; Royer v. Harris Well Servs., Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1247, 1248-49
(M.D. La. 1990); Rezendes v. Dow Coming Corp. 717 F. Supp. 1435, 1438 (E.D. Cal. 1989).
70. Greer v. Skilcraft, 704 F. Supp. 1570, 1583 (N.D. Ala. 1989). See also Saunders v. Wire Rope
Corp., 777 F. Supp. 1281, 1284-85 (E.D. Va. 1991).
71. Greer, 704 F. Supp. at 1583.
72. The court in Saunders summarized this view:
Congress did not intend plaintiffs, through gimmicks and artful maneuvering used in
connection with the one year bar to removal, to straightjacket or deprive non-resident
defendants of their legitimate entitlements to removal.
Clearly, Congress intended to exclude certain diversity cases from being held in federal
court, but it is equally clear Congress did not intend to establish a rule which would allow
plaintiffs to circumvent diversity jurisdiction altogether ....
Saunders, 777 F. Supp. at 1284-85 (citing Kite v. Richard Wolf Medical Instruments, 761 F. Supp. 597
(S.D. Ind. 1989)).
73. The Martine court stated:
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opportunity to invoke a congressional intent argument. Although judges must not
act as legislators, where there is some ambiguity in the law or where the application
of the law is contrary to congressional intent, a jurisprudential exception to curb
abuse of the law as written is appropriate.74
C. Does the One-Year Time Limit Apply to Both Paragraphs of§ 1446?
The Martine court stated that "regardless of when a diversity case becomes
removable, the case cannot be removed to federal court more than one year after
the commencement of the action in state court."75 The Martine court broadly
interpreted the one-year limitation as applying to cases that are initially removable
and to cases that are not initially removable as defined in both paragraphs of §
1446(b).
However, it is not clear that the one-year time limit applies to both para-
graphs.76 Courts applying the time limit to both paragraphs find that removal
statutes are to be strictly construed against removal.77
The plain language of § 1446(b) may be reasonably construed as stating
that all cases removed on the basis of diversity are subject to the one-year
limit.... [T]he fact that Congress chose to place the one-year limit after
only one paragraph instead of both should not detract from the purpose
of § 1446(b) ... to require prompt removal once diversity of citizenship
is known.78
It is clear that a plaintiff could not withhold service [on a defendant] for one year without
good cause under the provisions of Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The
Court also questions whether such conduct is included within the congressional purpose in
implementing the one year time limitation in the rle-to minimize interruptions in
proceedings pending before the state court. It is very difficult to see how a removal under
the facts of this case can interfere with the state court proceedings when none have occurred
because of plaintiffs' decision to withhold service until the one year time limitation has
expired.
Martine, 837 F. Supp. at 750.
74. Grassi v. Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., 894 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1990) ("Federal courts should not
sanction devices intended to prevent a removal to a Federal court where one has that right, and should
be equally vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the Federal court as to permit the state courts, in
proper cases, to retain their own jurisdiction.") (citing Wecker v. National Enameling & Stamping Co,,
204 U.S. 176, 185-86, 27 S. Ct. 184, 188 (1907)).
75. Martine v. National Tea Co., 841 F. Supp. 1421, 1421 (M.D. La.), reconsideration denied, 837
F. Supp. 749 (1993), interlocutory appeal denied, No. 93-0193 (5th Cir., February 25, 1994). See also
Royer v. Harris Well Service, Inc.. 741 F. Supp. 1247, 1248 (M.D. La. 1990).
76. The defendants in Martine did not make the argument that the one-year limitation applies only
to the second paragraph of § 1446(b). Therefore, the court did not address whether the Middle District
would adopt this view.
77. See, e.g., Rezendes v. Dow Coming Corp., 717 F. Supp. 1435, 1437 (E.D. Cal. 1989)
("Removal statutes have historically been strictly construed.").
78. Perez v. General Packer, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1464, 1468 (C.D. Cal. 1992).
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However, this conclusion is flawed for two reasons. First, strict construction
of removal statutes does not mean manipulative construction. If the statute is clear
and unambiguous, the court should not manipulate it to prevent removal. Second,
to find that the limitation could be reasonably construed to apply to both paragraphs
ignores the rules of English grammar. The plain language of § 1446(b) mandates
application of the one-year limit to the second paragraph only. Congress did not
simply place the amendment after the second paragraph as an independent
statement that applies to both paragraphs, as the court in Perez erroneously
portrays. 79 Rather, the time limit is a qualifying phrase connected to the body of
the second paragraph. It is well-established in English grammar that a qualifying
phrase modifies only what immediately precedes it. Therefore, this qualifying
phrase should not modify the first paragraph, but only the second.
Courts supporting the application of the one-year limit to both paragraphs also
argue that "[olne of Congress' major concerns addressed by the Judicial Improve-
ments Act was the rising caseload in the federal courts."80 Therefore, there is
support in the legislative history for applying the one-year limit to both para-
graphs.
8
'
In Rezendes v. Dow Corning Corp.,2 the court acknowledges that Congress
explicitly stated in the legislative history that "the amendment 'addresses problems
that arise from a change of parties as an action progresses toward trial in state
court."' These actions are covered by the second paragraph of § 1446. But, the
court stated that Congress did not indicate that application of the one-year rule was
intended to only apply in such situations.
However, several factors support the argument that Congress did indicate that
the one-year limit applied to the second paragraph only. Congress created the
amendment as a dependent clause, connected to the second paragraph. Congress
explicitly stated that it was concerned with reducing the opportunity for remand
after substantial progress has been made in state court-progress that does not
occur in cases covered by the first paragraph of § 1446(b). Congress also explicitly
stated that the amendment addresses problems that arise from a change of parties
as an action progresses toward trial in state court, not with cases that are initially
removable.8 3 Congress cannot provide every possible application of the amend-
ment in the legislative history. Nevertheless, if Congress was so concerned with
the rising caseload and wanted to indicate that the one-year limit applied to both
paragraphs, it could have done so.
The third reason given by the courts for applying the one-year limit to both
paragraphs is-that such an interpretation will preserve comity between the state and
federal courts.' However, comity between the state and federal courts is not
79. Id.
80. Rezendes, 717 F. Supp. at 1438.
81. The legislative history is cited supra at note 64.
82. Rezendes, 717 F. Supp. at 1438.
83. See supra note 64.
84. Rezendes, 717 F. Supp. at 1437; Perez v. General Packer, Inc., 790 F. Supp. 1464, 1467 (C.D.
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endangered when the federal courts retain jurisdiction over a case that the defendant
has a right to remove. A case governed by the first paragraph of § 1446(b) could
hardly progress in state court because the defendant has only thirty days to remove
after receiving the initial pleading. Therefore, by retaining jurisdiction over a case
governed by the first paragraph, a federal court will neither disrupt nor disturb the
state court proceeding-nor threaten comity. Martine was such a case.
The court in Rezendes made one final argument for applying the one-year
limitation to the first paragraph of § 1446(b). It stated:
[E]ven assuming that the final clause in § 1446(b) only applies to cases
not initially removable, plaintiffs are still able to prevent removal of
diversity actions simply by joining a non-diverse defendant at the outset,
(thereby making "the case stated by the initial pleading" one which is not
removable) and refusing to serve and/or refusing to dismiss the non-
diverse defendant until after the one-year time limit has passed.8,
However, the Rezendes court failed to consider the fraudulent joinder
doctrine.' If the federal court finds that the plaintiff joined the resident defendant
solely for the purposes of defeating diversity jurisdiction, the court may disregard
the resident defendant for purposes of removal." Therefore, the court could treat
the case as one that is initially removable and not subject to the one-year
limitation.88
VI. LOUISIANA CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE ARTICLE 421 AND THE FEDERAL
REMOVAL STATUTES
Under § 1446, the one-year time limit runs from the "commencement of the
action." The Martine court and other courts use state law to determine when a suit
commences for purposes of the one-year time limit for removal. 89 Therefore, it
is necessary to evaluate Louisiana's definition of "commencement." Article 421
of the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure provides that a civil action "is com-
menced by the filing of a pleading presenting demand to a court of competent.
jurisdiction."'  The defendants in Martine, however, argued that an action does
not commence with mere filing of the suit. Rather, the defendants, citing Greer v.
Cal. 1992); Horn v. Service Merchandise Co., 727 F. Supp. 1343, 1345 (N.D. Cal. 1990).
85. Rezendes, 717 F. Supp. at 1439 n.3.
86. The fraudulent joinder doctrine is discussed infra at note 99.
87. Carriere v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 893 F.2d 98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 817, 111 S.
Ct. 60 (1990); B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1981).
88. Plaintiffs may, however, defeat removal by legitimately joining a resident defendant and
refusing to serve the defendant until after one year. Therefore, other legislative action is needed to
completely eliminate the effect of withholding service from the defendant.
89. Some courts do not believe state law should be used to determine when a suit is commenced
under the removal statutes. See supra note 59.
90. See supra note 13.
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Skilcraft,9' argued that an action is commenced when a party files a pleading
presenting demand, and makes a bona fide attempt to serve process on the
defendant. 92
However, Louisiana courts have held that Article 421 does not require a bona
fide effort to serve. 9a These courts have interpreted Article 421 according to its
clear and unambiguous language-an action "is commenced by the filing of a
pleading." Service of citation is not a condition precedent to the civil action's
commencement." Therefore, applying Louisiana law, a suit is commenced by its
filing for purposes of § 1446(b). The court in Martine could not use Greer as
precedent because it applied Alabama, not Louisiana, law. Without a uniform
definition of "commencement," federal courts will have conflicting decisions
regarding the removal statutes, which are intended to be uniform in their applica-
tion. This note recommends that Congress eliminate this problem by amending §
1446(b) to provide a uniform definition for commencement of an action. 95
VII. THE COURT'S POWER TO CURB ABUSES
A. An Intentional Withholding of Service Exception?
The plain language of § 1446(b) seems to give to the plaintiff the power to
eliminate removal based on diversity jurisdiction by intentionally withholding
service of process. Such action causes delay and undermines the congressional
purpose of amending § 1446(b). What power does the court have to stop these
91. 704 F. Supp. 1570 (N.D. Ala. 1989).
92. Several Alabama cases have stated that under the Alabama Code of Civil Procedure "an action
is commenced when the complaint ... is filed with the court, although the event does not constitute
'commencement' for all purposes." These cases held that an "action [is] not 'commenced' when...
filed with the circuit clerk ... with[out] the bonafide intention of having it immediately served." Greer,
704 F. Supp. at 1583 (citing Ward v. Saben Appliance Co., 391 So. 2d 1030. 1035 (Ala. 1980)).
93. Martinez v. Reed, 490 So. 2d 303, 306 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1986); de la Vergne v. de la Vergne,
479 So. 2d 549. 550 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1985); Haynie v. Haynie, 452 So. 2d426,427 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1984); Sims v. Sims, 247 So. 2d 602, 603-04 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1971).
94. A review of several older Louisiana cases reveals that under prior law an action did not
commence until service of citation on the defendant. D'Asaro v. Sawyer, 87 So. 2d 346 (La. Ct. App.,
Orl. 1956); Commercial Nat'l Bank v. Henderson, 173 So. 790, 791 (2d Cir. 1937). See also Federal
Ins. Co. v. T. L. James & Co., 69 So. 2d, 636, 638 (La. App. Orl. 1954) (The court found that, for
purposes of prescription, "[a] plaintiff cannot hand a petition to the clerk, with instructions to make an
entry of filing on it. and then withhold it from service until further instructions, and afterwards contend
that the petition was actually filed when the entry of filing was made."); Canada v. Frost Lumber Indus.,
Inc., 9 So. 2d 338, 340 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942).
This jurisprudence was based on 1870 Code of Practice article 359 that provided:
The joining of issue is in fact the foundation of the suit, as citation is that of the action; it
is only after this is done that the suit begins; the parties are then in a situation to discover
what evidence is necessary in support of their respective claims.
(emphasis added). The present Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure replaced the 1870 Code of Practice
in 1960.
95. Discussed infra in Part VIII.
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abuses? In Wecker v. National Enameling and Stamping Co.," the United States
Supreme Court stated:
[T]he Federal courts should not sanction devices intended to prevent a
removal to a Federal court where one has that right, and should be equally
vigilant to protect the right to proceed in the Federal court as to permit the
state courts, in proper cases, to retain their own jurisdiction.'
When a party intentionally tries to defeat removal, the Supreme Court firmly
stated that "the Federal courts may, and should, take such action as will defeat
attempts to wrongfully deprive parties entitled to sue in Federal courts of the
protection of their rights in those tribunals.""8 The courts have created several
jurisprudential exceptions in an attempt to curb attempts to wrongfully defeat the
right of removal. These exceptions include the fraudulent joinder doctrine and the
improper assignment of interest rule.
The fraudulent joinder rule covers those instances in which a plaintiff in a civil
action has "fraudulently joined" a defendant for the sole purpose of defeating the
federal court's diversity jurisdiction. Without complete diversity, a defendant
cannot remove a case to federal court. The removing defendant has the heavy
burden of proving fraudulent joinder."
To prove fraudulent joinder, the defendant "must show either that there is no
possibility that the plaintiff would be able to establish a cause of action against the
[resident) defendant in state court; or that there has been outright fraud in the
plaintiff's pleading of jurisprudential facts."' ° The federal district court "must
then evaluate all of the factual allegations in the light most favorable to the plaintiff,
resolving all contested issues of substantive fact in favor of the plaintiff."''
Further, "the district court must resolve any uncertainties as to the current state of
controlling substantive law in favor of the plaintiff."'0 2 If the federal court finds
that there is even a possibility that a state court would find a cause of action stated
against the resident defendant, it must find that the resident defendant has been
properly joined and remand the case to state court for lack of diversity jurisdic-
tion.10 3 On the other hand, if the federal court finds that the plaintiff joined the
non-resident defendant solely for the purpose of defeating diversity, and there is no
possibility of a valid claim against the resident defendant, then the court may
96. 204 U.S. 176, 27 S. Ct. 184 (1907).
97. Id. at 186, 27 S. Ct. at 188, quoted with approval by the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals in
Grassi v. Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., 894 F.2d 181, 183 (5th Cir. 1990).
98. Id. at 182-83, 27 S. Ct. at 187.
99. Carriere v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 893 F.2d 98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 817, 111 S.
Ct. 60 (1990); B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 1981).
100. B., hIc., 663 F.2d at 549 (footnote omitted).
101. Id.
102. Id.
103. Id. at 550.
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disregard the resident defendant for purposes of diversity jurisdiction and remov-
al. 104
The improper assignment of interest rule functions in a similar manner. It
authorizes and imposes a duty on federal district courts to "examine the motives
underlying a partial assignment which destroys diversity and to disregard the
assignment in determining jurisdiction if it be found to have been made principally
to defeat removal."'05 Federal courts have created these exceptions to support
their policy of protecting a party's right to remove a case to federal court.
A judicially created exception to the one-year time period of § 1446 designed
to defeat attempts by plaintiffs to deprive defendants of the right to remove by
intentionally withholding service of process would be consistent with the Supreme
Court's mandate. As the court in Martine stated, "It appears that a similar rule is
required [to protect the defendant's right to removal] where a plaintiff intentionally
withholds service on a defendant for one year to prevent a defendant from
removing a case to federal court."' 6 Therefore, if a federal district court finds
that a party intentionally withholds service to defeat removal under the one-year
time limit set forth in § 1446(b), a rule similar to that devised for improper
assignments would allow the court to disregard the elapsed time in determining the
timeliness of the removal. If such a rule is created, the court must also determine
the burden of proof that must be satisfied by the defendant.
B. Requisite Burden of Proof
For the court to find a "fraudulent joinder," the removing party must prove by
clear and convincing evidence that there is no possibility that the plaintiff has a
cause of action against a resident defendant. 7 On the other hand, improper or
collusive assignment is resolved as a simple question of fact.'0 8 A rule governing
intentional withholding of service should be subject to the same standard as
improper assignment. To better understand the reason behind this conclusion, one
must understand why fraudulent joinder and improper assignment.are subject to
different standards of proof. The court in Grassi v. Ciba-Geigy, Ltd. explained that
"in a fraudulent joinder case, . . . the only way to attack the joinder is by proving
104. Carriere v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 893 F.2d 98 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 817, 111 S.
Ct. 60 (1990); B., Inc. v. Miller Brewing Co., 663 F.2d 545 (5th Cir. 1981).
105. Grassi v. Ciba-Geigy, Ltd., 894 F.2d 181, 185 (5th Cir. 1990). For a more detailed discussion
of improper assignment, see 8 A.L.R. Fed. 845 (1971) (validity in effect of plaintiffs assignment of
claim or part thereof to prevent removal of action from state court to federal district court on grounds
of diversity of citizenship).
106. Martine v. National Tea Co., 837 F. Supp. 749, 750 (M.D. La. 1993), interlocutory appeal
denied, No. 93-0193 (5th Cir., Febnary 25, 1994).
107. Grassi, 894 F.2d at 186 (acknowledging that "claims of fraudulent joinder must be plead
with particularity and proved by clear and convincing evidence") (citing Parks v. New York Times Co.,
308 F.2d 474, 478 (5th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 949, 84 S. Ct. 964 (1964)).
108. Id. (citing Bass v. Texas Power & Light Co., 432 F.2d 763, 766-67 (5th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 401 U.S. 975, 91 S. Ct. 1194 (1971)).
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fraud in the [opponent's] pleading of jurisdictional facts. As with any allegation
of fraud, it must be proved by clear and convincing evidence."'" On the other
hand, in a collusive assignment case, the parties do not allege fraud in the
pleadings. Rather, the court evaluates an assignment that does not concern the
merits of the case. Therefore, the issue of whether there has been a collusive
assignment is to be resolved as a simple question of fact." ° Because fraudulent
joinder cases concern the merits of the case, all disputed issues of fact concerning
the defendant's liability must be resolved in the light most favorable to the plaintiff
to prevent the district court from having to try the entire case to determine whether
there has been a fraudulent joinder of a particular defendant. The district court
thereby avoids "trespass upon the judicial 'turf' of the state courts.' Because
partial assignment cases do not concern the merits of the case, "no question arises
of encroachment upon state court jurisdiction."'" 2
Just as the motive behind the assignment of interest does not concern the merits
of the case, the motive behind intentional withholding of service does not concern
the merits. The party complaining of the withholding of service would not allege
fraud regarding the facts of the case. Therefore, the claim should not be subject to
the higher legal standard applied in fraudulent joinder cases. In investigating
motive, the court need not delve into the merits of the case, and will not "trespass
upon the judicial" turf of the state court. Similar to collusive assignment cases, the
issue of whether service was withheld to prevent removal under the one-year limit
of § 1446(b) should be resolved as a simple question of fact.
Federal courts have adopted the view that removal statutes are to be strictly
construed against removal and in favor of remand. The Supreme Court of the
United States explained this rule in Shamrock Oil & Gas Corp. v. Sheets:"3
Not only does the language of the Act of 1887 evidence the Congres-
sional purpose to restrict the jurisdiction of the federal courts on removal,
but the policy of the successive acts of Congress regulating the jurisdic-
109. Grassi, 894 F.2d at 186.
110. Id.
111. Id.
112. The court in Grassi explained the difference between fraudulent joinder and collusive
assignment as follows:
[Diespite having similar effects on jurisdiction, fraudulent joinder cases are fundamentally
different from collusive assignment cases. The first issue involved in resolving an allegation
of fraudulent joinder is whether the plaintiff has stated a claim against the nondiverse
defendant. In doing so, all disputed issues of fact concerning that defendant's liability must
be resolved in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. This is done to prevent the trial court
from having to try the entire case in order to determine whether a claim has been stated
against a particular defendant. In this manner the district court avoids "trespass upon the
judicial 'turf' of the state courts." In the case of a partial assignment, however, a
determination of the motive behind the assignment does not concern the merits of the case.
so that no question arises of encroachment upon state court jurisdiction.
Id. (citations omitted).
113. 313 U.S. 100,61 S. Ct. 868(1941).
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tion of federal courts is one calling for the strict construction of such
legislation .... "Due regard for the rightful independence of state
governments, which should actuate federal courts, requires that they
scrupulously confine their own jurisdiction to the precise limits which the
statute has defined."
'
"
4
The policy behind the strict construction of removal statutes is to prevent
encroachment on the state courts' jurisdiction and to preserve comity, as well as to
protect the right of the plaintiff to choose the forum." 5 If there is a doubt as
between allowing removal or remanding the case to state court, remand will usually
prevail.
The court in Martine contended that creating a new jurisprudential rule
regarding intentional withholding of service should be the work of the Supreme
Court or an appellate court. However, the defendant may not be allowed access
to the alpellate court if his case is remanded. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d) an "order
remanding a case to the State court from which it was removed is not reviewable
on appeal or otherwise." The Supreme Court in Therntron Products, Inc. v.
Hernansdorfer"6 held that § 1447(d) prohibited review only of remand orders
based on § 1447(c)." 7 Therintron allows appeal or review by writ when remand
was based on purely administrative concerns. Congress has since amended 28
U.S.C. § 1447(c)," 8 and appellate courts are having difficulty applying Therntr-
on under the new language of § 1447(c)." 9
The Fifth Circuit stated in In re Shell Oil Company:
When Congress amended § 1447(c), it deleted the reference to
"improvident removal" while simultaneously adding a requirement that
motions to remand based on "any defect in removal procedure" be made
within 30 days. These changes reflect a congressional intent to delete
improvident removal as an unreviewable basis for remand .... This
114. Id. at 108-09, 61 S. Ct. at 872 (citation omitted).
115. Smith v. Executive Fund Life Ins. Co., 651 F. Supp. 269, 270 (M.D. La. 1986).
116. 423 U.S. 336, 96 S. Ct. 584 (1976).
117. At the time of Thermitron, 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) read in part: "If at any time before final
judgment it appears that the case was removed improvidently and without jurisdiction, the district court
shall remand the case ....-
118. Pub. L. No. 100-702, § 1016(c)(1) amended 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c) to read in part: "A motion
to remand the case on the basis of any defect in removal procedure must be made within 30 days after
the filing of the notice of removal under section 1446(a). If at any time before final judgment it appears
that the district court lacks subject matter jurisdiction, the case shall be remanded."
119. See h re Allstate Ins. Co., 8 F.3d 219,221 (5th Cir. 1993) (holding that the court "may review
a remand order on petition for writ of mandamus ... provided that it was entered on grounds not
authorized by § 1447(c)"). Cf i re Medscope Marine Ltd., 972 F.2d 107, 110 (5th Cir. 1992) (holding
that timely remand motions premised on a defect in removal procedure are unreviewable under §
1447(d)). See also In re Digicon Marine, Inc., 966 F.2d 158 (5th Cir. 1992); McDermott Int'l, Inc. v.
Lloyds Underwriters, 944 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1991); hi re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1523 (5th Cir. 1991)
(allowing appeal of remand); hi re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d 1518 (5th Cir. 1991) (allowing review on
petition of mandamus); Soley v. First Nat'l Bank of Commerce, 923 F.2d 406 (5th Cir. 1991) (not
allowing appeal).
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leaves remand orders for lack of subject matter jurisdiction as the only
clearly unreviewable remand orders.
20
Therefore, if the Court in Martine based its remand on something other than
lack of subject matter jurisdiction, under In re Shell Oil Company, the Fifth
Circuit will have jurisdiction to review the case on appeal. The court in Martine
held that its remand order is based on 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) and is not based on
§ 1447(c).' 2' However, the Fifth Circuit did not follow In re Shell Oil Compa-
ny 22 and refused to consider an appeal of the defendant.
23
The Martine court contended, this is "a classic case for appellate review
under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) if review by ordinary appeal is not available."' 2
Nevertheless, the Fifth Circuit determined, based on In re Medscope Marine Ltd.,
that it had no jurisdiction to consider the appeal. The Martine court was correct
when it concluded that "[i]t is possible that only the Congress can correct the
concerns the Court has about a plaintiff intentionally withholding service for a
year to prevent a defendant from removing a case to federal court.' ' "25 The
Fifth Circuit's decision makes it clear that until Congress acts to remedy these
abuses, the federal district courts should create a jurisprudential rule to prevent
plaintiffs from defeating removal by intentionally withholding service of process.
The Supreme Court in Wecker gave the federal courts its approval to do so.
126
Accordingly, it would be appropriate to create such a rule.
VIII. PROPOSED LEGISLATIVE SOLUTIONS
Congress has several options to correct these inequities arising under §
1446(b). First, Congress could amend § 1446(b) to clarify that the one-year
120. In re Shell Oil Co., 932 F.2d at 1520 (footnote omitted).
121. Martine v. National Tea Co., 837 F. Supp. 749, 750 (M.D. La. 1993), interlocutory appeal
denied, No. 93-0193 (5th Cir., February 25, 1994).
122. In re Shell Oil Co. was based partially on Air-Shields. Inc. v. Fullam. 891 F.2d 63 (3d Cir.
1989), in which the Third Circuit found that the district court's remand for untimely removal was based
on § 1446(b) and not on § 1447(c). Therefore, the panel held that it could review the writ of mandamus
applied for by the defendant.
123. Martine v. National Tea Co., No. 93-0193 (February 25, 1994). The Fifth Circuit stated:
The district court's basis for the remanding the instant case was the defendants removal of
the action from state court after it has been pending there for more than one year. 28 U.S.C.
§ 1446(b) proscribes removal of cases on the basis of jurisdiction more than one year after
commencement of the action. Timely remand motions premised on a defect in removal
procedure are unreviewable by this Court.
124. The court stated that "[a~ll of the requirements of § 1292(b) are met in this case. The order
involves a controlling question of law to which there is a difference of opinion and a decision from the
appellate court will materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation." Martine, 837 F. Supp.
at 75 1.
125. Id. at 750.
126. Recall that the Fifth Circuit cited Wecker with approval in Grassi v. Ciba-Geigy. See supra
note 1.
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limitation applies only to the second paragraph. By applying the limitation only
to cases that have progressed toward trial (paragraph two cases), Congress' intent
will be achieved.1 27 Second, Congress could amend § 1446(b) to include a
uniform definition of commencement. To eliminate the particular abuse
discussed in this note, the uniform definition should state that an action is
commenced by the filing of the suit in state court coupled with a bona fide effort
of the plaintiff to serve process on the defendant. Third, Congress could impose
a time limit for service under § 1446 similar to that of Rule 4 of the Federal
Rules of Civil Procedure.12 8 For example, if the party who filed suit in state
court does not serve the defendant within 120 days after the filing of the action,
or cannot show good cause why such service was not made within that period,
the action shall not be considered "commenced" for purposes of computing the
one-year limit of § 1446(b).
Both of these amendments are consistent with the policy that the removal
statute, which is nationwide in its operation, is intended to be uniform in its
application and unaffected by local law definitions or characterizations of the
subject matter to which it is to be applied.
The Louisiana legislature could also eliminate the abuse of intentionally
withholding service to defeat removal by amending Louisiana Code of Civil
Procedure article 421. Article 421 could be amended to require the filing of a
pleading presenting the demand to a court of competent jurisdiction and a bona
fide effort to serve the defendant to commence an action. The plaintiff would
no longer be able to simply withhold service on the defendant to defeat removal.
The plaintiff would have to prove that he at least made an effort to serve the
defendant at the time suit was filed.
Second, the legislature could amend the Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure
to impose time limits on service of process similar to those of Rule 4(j) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Presently, a party can file a lawsuit in state
court and withhold service of process for up to five years.129 The amendment
would eliminate this practice by mandating that service be made within the time
limit, unless the plaintiff can show good cause why service was not made.
The lack of a time limit for service creates a gap in the law that undermines
some of the policies behind the laws of prescription. It discourages prompt
127. Martine illustrates that paragraph one cases, those that are initially removable, do not progress
in state court when the plaintiff withholds service of process for over one year. Therefore, removal of
the case will not disrupt the state proceeding.
128. Rule 4(3) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides in pertinent part:
If a service of the summons and complaint is not made upon a defendant within 120 days
after the filing of the complaint and the party on whose behalf such service was required
cannot show good cause why such service was not made within that period, the action shall
be dismissed as to that defendant without prejudice upon the court's own initiative with
notice to such party or upon motion.
129. La. Code Civ. P. art. 561 provides in part:
An action is abandoned when the parties fail to take any step in its prosecution or defense
in the trial for a period of five years.
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adjudication of claims and consequently allows relevant evidence to become
stale. Also, this gap allows parties to delay the lawsuit to increase the amount
of prejudgment interest that the other party must pay on a judgment. The
amendment would fill this gap and remove many of the opportunities for abuse.
IX. CONCLUSION
Congress has created a statutory right for a defendant to remove a case to
federal court. The Supreme Court has stated that defendants should not be
wrongfully deprived of this right. The recent amendment to 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)
slightly curtails the defendant's right by providing a one-year limitation on
removal in diversity cases. Although Congress intended to reduce interference
with a pending state court suit and eliminate unnecessary delays and disruptions
of the judicial process, the amendment may actually cause judicial delay by
inviting plaintiffs to intentionally withhold service of process from defendants to
prevent removal of the suit to federal court. Congress' intent will not be
implemented under the current language of the amendment.
The intentional deprivation of a defendant's right to remove a suit to federal
court should not be endorsed by the courts or Congress. Congress should amend
28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) to clarify that the one-year limitation applies only to the
second paragraph. Congress should also amend 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b) to provide
a uniform definition of "commencement" of a suit for purposes of removal. This
amendment should require a plaintiff to make a bona fide effort to serve the
defendant within the time set forth in Rule 4 of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure. Similar action should be taken by the Louisiana legislature to amend
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure article 421 to require service of process
within 120 days from the filing of the suit in state court. Until Congress or the
Louisiana legislature takes appropriate action to curb the abuse of the one-year
limitation on removal in diversity cases, or it they fail to take action, federal
courts should create a intentional withholding of service exception to § 1446,
similar to the fraudulent joinder and improper assignment of interest exceptions.
Legislative or judicial action is clearly required to protect the defendant's right
to remove a suit to federal court.
Gordon D. Polozola
1994] 1441
